University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Operations, Information and Decisions Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

9-2008

Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem
Solving
Christian Terwiesch
University of Pennsylvania

Yi Xu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons, and the Technology and Innovation
Commons

Recommended Citation
Terwiesch, C., & Xu, Y. (2008). Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem Solving.
Management Science, 54 (9), 1529-1543. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0884

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/192
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem Solving
Abstract
In an innovation contest, a firm (the seeker) facing an innovation-related problem (e.g., a technical R&D
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seeker and a set of solvers. Prior research in economics suggests that having many solvers work on an
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innovation contest resulting from the solvers' underinvestment can further be reduced by changing the
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Abstract
In an innovation contest, a rm (the seeker) facing an innovation related problem
(e.g. a technical R&D problem) posts this problem to a population of independent
agents (the solvers) and then provides an award to the agent that generated the
best solution. In this paper, we analyze the interaction between a seeker and a set
of solvers. Prior research in Economics suggests that having many solvers work on
an innovation problem will lead to a lower equilibrium e&ort for each solver, which
is undesirable from the perspective of the seeker. In contrast, we establish that the
seeker can benet from a larger solver population as he obtains a more diverse set of
solutions, which mitigates and sometimes outweighs the e&ect of the solvers’ underinvestment in e&ort. We demonstrate that the ine^ciency of the innovation contest
resulting from the solvers’ under-investment can further be reduced by changing
the award structure from a xed price award to a performance contingent award.
Finally, we compare the quality of the solutions and seeker prots with the case of an
internal innovation process. This allows us to predict which types of products and
which cost structures will be the most likely to benet from the contest approach to
innovation.
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1

Introduction

Innovation is at the heart of every R&D process. While the detailed mechanics of R&D
di&er widely by industry, reecting di&erent cost structures, di&erent success rates, and
di&erent market rewards, the innovation process is remarkably similar across industries.
Drug candidates in a pharmaceutical development process, TV shows in an entertainment
company, and proposals in a venture capital rm all ow through a conceptually similar
innovation process. This process starts with the creation of many innovation opportunities
that are then evaluated in a ltering step that selects the most promising opportunity from
among the candidates.
Typically, the creation of opportunities as well as the selection from among the opportunities, happens inside an innovating rm. Inputs from various functions create new
opportunities that are then selected based on input from R&D, Marketing, and general
management. However, there exist a rapidly growing number of innovation processes that
rely on the outside world to create opportunities and then select the best from among
these alternatives for further development. This approach is often referred to as Open
Innovation (Chesbrough 2003, van Hippel 2005, Terwiesch and Ulrich 2006).
Open Innovation initiatives often rely on the altruism of its community members, their
desire to compete for status within the community (Loch et al. 2000), or their self interest
reecting their role as a user of the innovation (van Hippel 2005). A remarkable exception
to such non-nancial motives is the innovation contest. In an innovation contest, also
known as an innovation tournament, many individuals or teams submit plans or prototypes
to an innovating rm. Examples of innovation contests are QVC’s product road show (an
opportunity for inventors to showcase their ideas and potentially get them included in
QVC’s assortment), the DARPA Grand Challenge for autonomous robotic vehicles (an
open competition in which inventors can enter to win a substantial amount of money if
their innovation out-performs others concerning speed, range, or ability to conquer di^cult
terrain), and the recently launched TV casting show “The Million Dollar Idea” (see Ulrich
2006).
Despite attracting a signicant media attention, the importance of these innovation
contests has been rather small relative to the “traditional” innovation process. However,
2

this is currently changing. With a growing trend towards outsourcing and o&-shoring
innovation related activities (see Anderson et al. 2006, Eppinger and Chitkara 2006),
innovation contests and their applications have expanded from creating “crazy” concepts
to solid R&D problem solving in the recent years.
Consider the case of Innocentive, a company that acts as an intermediary and executes
hundreds of innovation contests every year for its clients. At Innocentive, scientists can
register and express what type of scientic problems they are interested in (most of them
are in the areas of molecular biology and chemistry). Innocentive acts as an intermediary
between these scientists (also known as “solvers”) and those — typically large rms’s R&D
organizations — that encounter technical or scientic problems as part of their R&D process
(also known as “seekers”). Innocentive works with seekers to formulate a statement describing the problem and the rules of the innovation tournament1 . Such a statement is
made accessible to a pool of 95,000 solvers from around the world. Depending on their
availability and interest, a sub-set of those will start working on the problem and an even
smaller subset will actually submit a solution. Innocentive will provide these solutions to
the seeker, who can decide if the solution is useful to him. If it is, the seeker can acquire
the intellectual property from the solver; typical rewards are between $10k and $50k.
Just like in the case of innovation contests executed by DARPA or QVC, the seeking
rm obtains several benets from this form of innovation: (a) it induces competition
among solvers; (b) the seeker only pays for successful innovations, but not for the failures;
the associated risks of failures are shifted to the solver; (c) the seeker gains access to a
broad pool of solvers so problems are solved by those who have the most relevant expertise
(d) there exists an opportunity of wage rate arbitrage or, more generally, cost savings; (e)
an increase in the capacity of idea generation and testing.
These potential benets have led companies with a long R&D tradition, such as Ely
Lilly or DuPont to use Innocentive’s innovation tournaments for a growing portion of their
R&D work. Innocentive’s business model of innovation has been praised in the business
1

To use an innovation contest as studied in this paper, the seeker has to be able to provide a clear

description of the problem. If the problem is highly complex with ill-dened interfaces, it is not suitable
for an innovation contest as the resulting coordination costs would be too high (e.g., Ulrich and Ellison
1999, Novak and Eppinger 2001, Mihm et al. 2003).
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press (New York Times — March 26, 2006; Business Week — January 9, 2006; Harvard
Business Review — March 2006) and has received several innovation awards (including
the “Business Process Award” from the Economist’s Innovation Summit and the “Infosys
Transformation Award” from The Wharton School).
Despite this growing popularity, little remains known about when such innovation contests should be used and how innovation contests should be executed. In absence of
appropriately designed contracts (rules of the tournament), any form of a decentralized
system will lead to in-e^ciencies reecting information and incentive problems. Our research questions aim to address these problems:
-

What type of innovation problems are most suited to be solved by innovation

contests and what problems are better solved internally?
-

For a given type of innovation problem, what is the optimal design of the inno-

vation contest? Specically, what is the optimal award and how many solvers should the
seeker attempt to reach?
Providing answers to these questions is the contribution of this paper. We combine
prior research from the eld of contests and tournaments (e.g. Moldovanu and Sela 2001)
with models of product development and search (e.g. Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Terwiesch and Loch 2004). We provide the following novel results. First, we derive the
optimal innovation contest award mechanism (Theorem 1a) and show how the quality of
the submissions and the prots for the seeker depend on the number of potential solvers
(Theorem 1b). Having many solvers work on an innovation problem will lead to a lower
equilibrium e&ort for each solver, which is undesirable from the perspective of the seeker.
While prior economics research has argued that it is optimal to restrict the number of
participants to reduce this e&ect, we derive an additional benet of having a large pool of
solvers: the seeker can benet from a larger solver population because he obtains a more
diverse set of solutions, which mitigates and sometimes outweighs the e&ect of underinvestment from each solver (Theorem 1c). Second, the ine^ciency of the innovation
contest resulting from the solvers’ under-investment can further be reduced by changing
the award structure of the innovation contest. While prior research has advocated the use
of xed price rewards, we show that a performance contingent award can lead to better
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solutions, higher seeker-prots and system e^ciency (Theorem 2). Third, we compare
innovation contests hosted by the seeker and by an intermediary with the case of an internal innovation process (Theorems 3a and 3b). This allows us to predict which types
of products and which cost structures will be the most likely to benet from the contest
approach to innovation. We also show that the seeker primarily benets from open innovation by obtaining higher performance and not only by obtaining lower costs. These
results, we believe, are of interests to rms executing innovation contests as well as those
participating or considering to participate as either seeker or solver. Moreover, in light
of the ongoing discussions concerning the o&-shoring of R&D work, we believe that our
results should also be of interest to a much broader audience.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We rst review the relevant
literature (Section 2)2 , followed by the development of our modeling framework (Section
3). Sections 4 to 6 establish our main results (Theorems 1-3), and Section 7 concludes the
paper.

2

Relevant Literature

Our model presented in Section 3 combines research on product development processes
with research on the economics of contests and tournaments. Over the last 15 years, a
number of product development process models were created (e.g. Ulrich and Krishnan
2001, Loch and Kavadias 2007). While the detailed mathematics of the various models
di&er, they collectively suggest (a) that product development should be modeled as a
stochastic process and (b) that there exist di&erent types of product development problems.
The stochastic aspect of the product development process has been modeled as a search
process in an array of binary variables (Loch et al. 2001), sequential draws from a distribution (Terwiesch and Loch 2004, based on work by Weitzman 1979), parallel draws
from a distribution (Dahan and Mendelson 2001, based on an application of extreme value
models), or a series of Bernoulli trials (e.g. Ha and Porteus 1995). Our model applies the
previous work by Dahan and Mendelson in that we view the innovations undertaken by one
2

An extended literature review is provided in the electronic companion.
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solver as a set of parallel experiments. The performance outcome of this experimentation
is the highest realization of the parallel draws (i.e. the n-th order statistics or the extreme
value model). This corresponds to a single period model, where a solver only makes the
decision on how much to experiment once.
One of the major accomplishments of the prior product development literature has
been to demonstrate that the type of product development problem matters greatly and
should inuence the process of searching for an optimal solution. Problem types di&er
along multiple dimensions, including (a) the amount of uncertainty in the overall pay-o&
function and hence the solver’s ability to predict the outcome of an experiment and (b) the
ability of the solver to learn from one experiment to another. Loch et al. (2006) discuss
di&erent problem types and their implications for managing the associated risks.
The second stream of research that we draw from relates to the design of contests
and tournaments (e.g., Glazer and Hassin 1988, Lazear and Rosen 1981). This research
has a long tradition in Economics and has recently seen a number of applications in
Operations Management (e.g., Deng and Elmaghraby 2005) and Marketing, especially in
the salesforce domain (e.g., Kalra and Shi 2001, Chen and Xiao 2005). There exists,
however, two crucial di&erences between a salesforce contest and an innovation contest.
First, the seeker in an innovation contest is interested in maximizing the value of the
highest performance outcome. The seeker in a salesforce contest, in contrast, is interested
in maximizing the sum across all outcomes. Put di&erently, an R&D department prefers
100 bad ideas and 1 outstanding idea over 101 good ideas while a marketing department
prefers 101 salespersons with good revenues over 100 salesperson with bad revenues and
1 salesperson with outstanding revenue.

Second, participation decisions for solvers are

fully voluntary in an innovation contest, whereas salespersons are forced to participate in
a salesforce contest.
There exists a small set of papers in the economics literature that have applied contests
and tournaments to R&D settings. Taylor (1995) and Fullerton and McAfee (1999) study
the optimal design of research tournaments with a sequential stochastic model. These
papers focus on the competition among symmetric solvers: the seeker benets from buyer
power as the solvers are competing against each other. They nd that the contest su&ers
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from under-investment in e&ort by the solvers. To mitigate this e&ect, these models
suggest limiting the pool of solvers, potentially all the way down to two (Fullerton and
McAfee 1999). A two-solver contest is su^cient to induce competition while leaving a 50%
probability of winning to two symmetric rms.

3

Model Development

We consider an innovation problem in which the performance of the solution can be measured in a one dimensional space. The assumption of a one-dimensional performance
measure is common in product development. This one dimensional space could reect a
technical specication (e.g. the purity of a material obtained in a chemical reaction) or a
consumer’s utility measure (e.g. the expressed purchase intent). Similar one-dimensional
settings are considered by Dahan and Mendelson (2001) and Terwiesch and Loch (2004).
The performance obtained from a solver is driven by three variables. First, each solver
i is endowed with an expertise, #i , which is a measure of his experience and knowledge
for a particular problem. For example, everything else equal, the solution to a chemical
engineering contest is more likely to be found by a chemist than by a biologist.

This

endowed knowledge is available to the solver at no cost. Second, each solver can enhance
the performance of his solution(s) by investing improvement e&ort, ei . Such improvement
e&ort corresponds, for example, to conducting a thorough patent search and literature
review, or to implementing rigorous quality control systems with high standards. E&ort
ei leads to a deterministic improvement r (ei ) of the performance of the solution, where
r (ei ) is an increasing and concave function in ei which measures the performance return
on the improvement e&ort. Let c1 ei be the costs associated with the improvement e&ort
of solver i.
Third, problem solving in innovation is often stochastic, which we capture by adding
a noise variable, , to the performance. Given this uncertain performance, the solver will
most likely engage in a search process by conducting a set of trials and experiments (see
e.g. Loch et al. 2001, Dahan and Mendelson 2001). Let mi be the number of experiments
conducted by solver i. The results of an experiment are captured by the multiple realiza-
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tions of the random variable, . Following the work by Dahan and Mendelson (2001), we
consider the specic case in which the random noise  is an i.i.d. Gumbel random variable
with mean zero and scale parameter . Note that a higher

increases the variance of a

draw. The associated costs are c2 mi .
Given an expertise, #i , an improvement e&ort, ei , and an experimentation e&ort, mi ,
the performance of the solution is assumed to be of the following additive form3 :
vi (#i , ei , mi , i ) = max {vij = #i + r (ei ) + ij , j = 1, 2, ..., mi } ,
j

(1)

Note that our performance function shown in (1) is rather general, as it includes a baseline
performance, a deterministic reward for e&ort, and a stochastic reward for e&ort.
The above general performance function nicely blends two important features of an
innovation project: heterogeneity in solver expertise (i.e., di&erent solvers have di&erent
#i s) and a stochastic relationship between e&orts and performance. Unfortunately, the
analytical tractability of such a general performance function is quite limited. For this
reason, we decompose the general performance function (1) into three interesting and
tractable special cases based on which of the three terms dominate.
Expertise based projects (ij = 0) have no stochastic inuence of the random
noise and thus experimentation is not necessary. Performance is driven by expertise and
improvement e&ort. Thus,
vi (#i , ei ) = #i + r (ei ) .
Such projects are low-risk projects with little novelty in them, such as converting a CAD
drawing into another format or designing a process recipe for a commonly used chemical
reaction. This type of concave, deterministic performance function is used in some of the
work on software development contracting (e.g. Whang 1992). Solvers are heterogenous
in their expertise. We assume that both the seeker and the solvers have identical beliefs
that #i is distributed across solvers with CDF F (#) and pdf f (#). It could be possible
that an expert or a solver with higher expertise has better information on the distribution
3

Of course, more complex functional forms could be considered. A purely multiplicative form could be

converted into an additive form by taking logarithms and then appropriately rescaling the cost functions. A
mixture of additive and multiplicative terms (e.g. an interaction term between expertise and deterministic
e&ort) could also be analyzed, but certainly would require numerical solutions.
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Projecttype

Characteristicsoftheproject

Engineeringtaskswithnouncertaintyin
Expertisebased
performancefunction(wellbehaved
project
solutionlandscape)

Actiontakenbysolver

Variablesdeterminingperformance

Investeffortto
enhancetheexisting
expertiserelevantto
theproject

Endowedexpertise(ßi)
Effort(e)

Investefforttocreate
thebestpossible
presentation

Effort(e)
Subjectivetasteofseeker(marketuncertainty)

Experimentbytrying
outmanysolutions
andthenpickingthe
onewiththehighest
performance

Numberofexperiments(m)
Outcomeofeachtrial(technicaluncertainty)

Example:modifyanexistingprocess
designtofitanewproductionsite
Ideation
project

Innovativeproblemswithnoclear
specifications,leadingtouncertaintyinthe
performancefunction
Example:Designnextgenerationbinder

Trialanderror
project

Solutionstoresearchproblemswith
welldefinedgoals,yethighlyrugged
solutionlandscapes,creating
uncertaintyinhowtoimprovea
solution
Example:Apillthatreducesgreyhair

Figure 1: Summary of the characteristics, mathematical representations, and examples of
expertise based projects, ideation projects, and trial and error projects.
of competitors’ expertise level.

We leave that case for future research.

a Gumbel distribution with scale parameter
results in the paper.

We will use

as a special case for F to illustrate some

Thus, the expertise-based project is essentially an auction model

with vi (#i , ei ) as a solver i’s bid.

Although the performance is certain for a solver, a

seeker still faces uncertainty with respect to the performance of the best solution obtained
from a pool of external solvers because of the heterogeneity in endowed solver expertise.
Ideation projects (#i = #, mi = 1) are broad and non-detailed innovation problems
for which the seeker looks for novel ideas. For example, recent Innocentive challenges
included “A product concept for a child-proof container of medication” or “The design
of the next generation binder”. Other examples of such projects include design contests
for the aesthetics of a new building or the logo for an event such as the FIFA world cup.
In these projects, the seeker’s taste, which is uncertain for the solver, plays an important
role in determining what constitutes a good solution.

Hence, in an ideation project,

the performance of a solution has a signicant noise term which reects heterogeneity
of solvers’ solutions in matching the seeker’s taste. All solvers are identical in terms of
endowed expertise, i.e., #i = #j = # for all i and j, that is, all solvers are equally capable
for such a broad problem ex ante. As before, solvers can spend e&ort to increase the quality
of their solution (e.g. by building a sophisticated prototype of their idea as opposed to
9

simply submitting a sketch on paper). Because the noise term will emerge after the seeker
reviews all submitted solutions, there is no point for solvers to invest in experimentation.
In this case, the performance of a solution is:
vi (ei , i ) = # + r (ei ) + i .
Trial and error projects (#i = #, e = 0) are innovation problems with an extremely
rugged solution landscape. The solver cannot anticipate the performance of a solution
before actually conducting the experiment. Yet, unlike for ideation problems, the solver
can observe the performance of a trial before submitting a solution. Thus, the uncertainty
the solver faces is entirely technical in its nature. Given the ruggedness of the solution
landscape, every experiment conducted has the same expected performance, i.e., #i = #j =
# for all i and j. Performance is driven by the experimentation e&ort and there exists
no learning from one round of experimentation to the other. The solver exerts e&ort by
experimenting (which increases the performance of the best solution stochastically) and
there exists no way of obtaining a deterministic return to e&ort. This case is equivalent
to the model presented by Dahan and Mendelson (2001):
vi (mi , i ) = max {vij = # + ij , j = 1, 2, ..., mi } .
j

Figure 1 summarizes the characteristics, mathematical representations, and examples of
these three project types. Figure 2 separates the uncertainty faced by the solver into a
technical uncertainty dimension and a market uncertainty dimension.
Given the project type, the seeker faces two decisions. First, the seeker needs to decide
if the problem should be solved internally or whether it should be posted to a broader
community in the form of an innovation contest. If the problem is solved internally, the
seeker needs to decide upon the two types of e&ort dened above.
If the problem is posted to a broader community, the general sequence of events is as
follows. The seeker needs to determine an award allocation mechanism. This mechanism
is announced (together with the problem) to all solvers. Each solver i has a privately
known expertise of #i for the problem. Solvers are risk-neutral and face three types of
costs: the costs of improvement e&ort (c1 ei ), the costs of experimentation (c2 mi ), and a x
cost of participation cf if the solver elects to work on the problem. Given solver i’s e&orts
10

High

Trialanderror
project

Technicaluncertainty
(“willitwork?”)

Low

Expertise
based
project

Ideation
project

Low

High
Marketuncertainty
(“willtheseekerlikeit?”)

Figure 2: The exposures of di&erent project types to technical uncertainty and market
uncertainty
(ei , mi ) the performance of her best solution, vi , is determined according to equation (1)
and the solution is submitted to the seeker.
Based on the performance vector of submitted solutions from n solvers, v = (v1 , v2, ..., vn ),
the seeker awards the solvers according to the announced mechanism. We assume the
seeker’s payo& to be a weighted combination of the performance of the best solution and
the expected average performance of all solutions:
V = ' max {vi } + (1  ')
i=1..n

P

i=1..n

n

vi

,

where 0  '  1. This formulation includes the special case in which the seeker is only
concerned about the value of the best solution (' = 1). However, it also lets us explore
the case in which the seeker cares about the overall quality of the submitted solutions.
For example, the solver might benet from combinations of the submitted solutions and
therefore favor a high average solution quality. In the extreme case, the solver might only
care about the average submitted solution quality (' = 0). This captures the case of the
traditional sales-force contest (see e.g. Chen and Xiao 2005) or a contest in which the
seeker obtains a (potentially negative) pay-o& for every submitted solution as is the case
in television contests such as American Idol.4
4

There exist other functional forms that could capture the seeker’s interest in more than the optimal

solution. Specically, it seems plausible that the seeker might be interest in the best m submitted solutions.
These cases lead to qualitatively similar results, yet are analytically intractable.
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Following the common settings in the contest literature, all parameters including #, n,
the performance function, the return function on e&ort, the distribution of solver expertise,
and costs are common knowledge to both the seeker and solvers5 , except a solver’s expertise
in an expertise-based project which is known to that solver only.

In addition, solvers’

e&orts are not observable and veriable to the seeker. The seeker attempts to maximize
the expected payo&, V , net of the costs of the award and the cost of internal development
e&ort (note that one of the two is zero). Each solver attempts to maximize the expected
net prot consisting of the expected award minus the costs of e&ort.

4

Open Innovation with Fixed Price Contest

In a xed price contest, the seeker announces a pre-specied award with a xed amount, A,
which will be granted to solvers according to a pre-announced award allocation structure.
The xed price contest is the most commonly adopted mechanism in open innovation
systems and is the standard contest used by Innocentive. Theorem 1a shows that instead
of splitting a pre-determined total award amount into two smaller awards, it is optimal to
allocate the entire award to the best solution. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 1a For a given amount of award A, assume that the seeker can allocate it to
at most two solvers with A1  A2  0 and A1 + A2 = A. For ideation projects and trial
and error projects, it is optimal for the seeker to grant the entire award to the solver with
the best solution (i.e., A1 = A and A2 = 0), while it may or may not be optimal for the
seeker to do so for expertise-based projects.
The above theorem establishes the optimality of the winner-takes-all award structure
for an open innovation contest with risk neutral seeker and solvers. For ideation projects
5

These assumptions are common in the literature on auctions and contests (e.g. Snir and Hitt (2003)

use very similar assumptions). As all assumptions, they are a simplication of the real world, made out of
analytical convenience rather than based on empirical observations. For example, in reality, the exact n
will not be known to all parties. The seeker could obtain an estimate of n from Innocentive. The solvers,
however, will have some prior distribution concerning n, which leads to a rational expectation about n.
As long as solvers have symmetric priors, we get to the same results that we have now (though the model
would be more complex).
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and trial and error projects, because solvers are symmetric in endowed expertise, they
react to award structures symmetrically. When the solvers are risk neutral, the marginal
incentive generated by one more dollar of award for the 1st prize is higher than the marginal
incentives generated by one more dollar of award for one of the lower prizes. As a result,
concentrating the award on the rst prize will generate the strongest incentives for solvers
to exert e&orts.

For expertise-based projects, because solvers have di&erent endowed

expertise, they react di&erently to reward structures. A winner-takes-all award structure
o&ers stronger incentive to solvers with high endowed expertise to exert e&ort as they
are more likely to win the single award, while a multiple-prize award structure is more
attractive to solvers with low endowed expertise since they have not much chance to win
the rst prize.

Therefore, whether a winner-takes-all award is optimal depends on the

distribution of the solver expertise. In the proof of the theorem, we derive a mild, necessary
and su^cient condition for the winner-takes-all contest to be optimal for expertise-based
projects. We will focus on the analysis of the winner-takes-all contest in this paper.
In a winner-takes-all contest, observing the seeker’s award A, the n solvers simultaneously make participation and e&ort decisions to ensure that the expected prot they could
earn from entering the contest is at least cf (i.e., a solver’s reservation prot is zero).
Each participating solver submits his (best) solution to the seeker for review. The solver
who produced the best solution among all n solvers will win the award A, while all other
solvers will not be awarded anything.
Consider a solver i with endowed expertise #i .

Observing the seeker’s award A and

his own expertise #i , solver i needs to decide how much improvement e&ort, ei , to exert
(leading to cost c1 ei ) and the number of experiments, mi , to conduct (leading to cost
c2 mi ). Following the existing literature on contests, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium
throughout the paper. Thus, in determining the e&ort level, solver i solves:
max

ei 0,mi 1

$i (ei , mi |n, e, m) = &i (A Pr{solver i wins}  c1 ei  c2 mi  cf )
= &i (A Pr {vi (#i , ei , mi , i ) > max {vj (#j , e, m, j ) , j 6= i and &j = 1}}
c1 ei  c2 mi  cf ) .

where &i = 0 if solver i decides not to participate and &i = 1 otherwise.

Let S (A) =

{& (A) , e (A) , m (A)} be the solvers’ equilibrium strategy for a given award A. We can
13

then write the seeker’s problem as
max  (A|n, S (A)) = ' max {&k (A) vk (#k , e (A) , m (A) , k ) , k = 1, 2, ..., n}
A0

CX

I

& (A) vk (#k , e (A) , m (A) , k )
k k
O  A,
n

+ (1  ') H

For the resulting equilibrium with given number of solvers n, Theorem 1b establishes
for each of the three project types the solver entry pattern, the amount of prize the
seeker awards, the amount of e&ort that each solver exerts, and the expected prot the
seeker earns. For the solver entry pattern, Theorem 1b derives the expected number of
participating solvers in a free-entry xed price contest, ne for expertise-based projects,
and the maximum number of solvers a free-entry xed price contest can accommodate,
ni and nt for ideation projects and trial and error projects, respectively6 .
The exposition of our results is much simpler with a specic functional form for the
e&ort function r(e)7 : r (e) =  ln e. Recall that for trial and error projects, there exists
by denition no improvement e&orts and hence no deterministic improvements (r(e) = 0).
However, for a trial and error project, given a solver’s experimentation e&ort m, the
expected performance of his best solution is

ln m (see Appendix for the detailed deriva-

tion), which is analogous to a logarithmic return function r (m) =

ln m. Therefore, for

expertise-based projects and ideation projects,  can be viewed as the return on e&ort coe^cient, and

can be viewed as the return on e&ort coe^cient for trial and error projects.

For ideation projects, from the solvers’ perspective,

also measures the stochastic e&ect

(variance) of the seeker’s evaluation.
Throughout the paper we use superscripts {e, i, t} for the expertise-based project, the
ideation project, and the trial and error project respectively.
6

In a free-entry contest, the seeker does not impose any restrictions on solvers’ entry to the contest.

It is completely up to a solver’s own choice on whether to enter the contest or not. ne , ni , and nt are
the expected or maximum number of solvers that a free-entry contest can accommodate for each type of
project such that every participating solver can earn a non-negative expected prot. It is possible that
ne , ni , and nt are small due to factors such as high xed cost for solvers. It is also worth noting that
a free-entry contest is not necessarily cost-free to solvers. For example, solvers may incur the xed cost
cf to enter a free-entry contest in our model.
7

Our key results are proven in the general case in the Appendix
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Theorem 1b In a xed price open innovation contest with n solvers, the unique equilibrium is dened as follows: (i) For expertise-based projects, only solvers with endowed
³

1

´

expertise that is higher than #f = F 1 (cf /Ae ) n1 will participate, where Ae is the oph

timal award. The improvement e&ort of a participating solver with expertise # ; #f , #
is
Ae F (#)n1  cf
e (#) =
,
c1

i

(2)

and the expected number of participating solvers in a free-entry xed price open innovation
contest is

³

1

´

ne = n 1  (cf /Ae ) n1 .
If cf = 0, the award is Ae =  and the expected prot for the seeker is
e

 ='

Z #

n1

#nF (#)

#

f (#) d# + (1  ')

Z #
#

Ã

!


(n  1) (' + (1  ') n) + n
#f (#) d# +  ln 
;
c1
n
(3)

(ii) For ideation projects, the improvement e&ort of the solver is
e =

2 (n  1)
,
c1 n2

(4)

the award is Ai = , the expected prot for the seeker is
Ã

!

2 (n  1)
 1 + ' ln n,
 = # +  ln
c1 n2
i

(5)

and the maximum number of participating solvers in a free-entry xed price open innovation contest is
ni 

 (  )
;
cf

(iii) For trial and error projects, the experimentation e&ort of the solver is
m =

(n  1)
,
n2 c2

the award is At = , the expected prot for the seeker is
t

 =#+

Ã

ln

!

(n  1)
 1  (1  ') ln n,
nc2
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(6)

and the maximum number of participating solvers in a free-entry xed price open innovation contest is
t

n =

s

cf

.

For all types of projects, the equilibrium solver e&ort is increasing in the award amount
A and decreasing in e&ort cost parameters c1 or c2 .

As e&ort cost parameter c1 or c2

increase, the seeker’s expected prot can decrease to zero.
solving for the project does not suit the contest model.

In this case, the problem
Figure 3 illustrates how the

equilibrium probability of winning for one solver, e&ort, and the seeker’s expected prot
change with respect to the size of the solver population, n. An interesting observation is
that from the equilibrium solver strategies ((d), (e), and (f) in Figure 3), we can see that
there exists a negative externality among solvers in all three projects: for a given award
A, the more solvers participate in the open innovation contest, the less e&ort each solver
exerts in equilibrium.
For an expertise-base project, the equilibrium e&ort e dened in (2) is decreasing in
n since F (#)  1. The negative externality e&ect in an expertise-based project is severe
since the equilibrium e&ort e (#, A) is a decreasing power function of n (see (d) in Figure
3).

For an ideation project, since the return function r is concave and n2 / (n  1) is

increasing in n, the equilibrium e&ort e dened in (4) is also decreasing in n, yet at a
slower rate. For a trial and error project, the equilibrium number of parallel experiments
m conducted by each rm is decreasing in n at an even slower rate.
The intuition behind this negative externality reecting an under-investment in solver
e&ort is that the more solvers participate in the contest, the lower the probability of
winning for a particular solver (see (a), (b), (c) in Figure 3). With lower winning probabilities, the solvers’ expected prots decrease, leading to weaker incentives for them to
exert higher e&orts. This under-investment in e&ort leads to an ine^ciency in an open
innovation system.
A similar argument can be made for the equilibrium e&ort (4) for an ideation project
with respect to parameter , which from the solvers’ perspective measures the stochastic
e&ect of the seeker’s taste. The equilibrium e&ort (4) is decreasing in : with increasing
variance, the e&ect of e&ort on the probability of winning is decreasing: the winner is
16

chosen by luck, not by his exerted e&ort e.
The negative externality among solvers also has an interesting impact on the solver
entry pattern. Consistent with intuition, the number of participating solvers is decreasing
in the xed cost cf irrespective of project type.

For a higher xed cost cf , a solver

needs to earn a higher expected prot to break even.

Since the equilibrium expected

prot a solver can earn is decreasing in the number of contestants, n, higher xed costs
lead to fewer participating solvers. For expertise-based projects, the xed cost excludes
solvers with low endowed expertise from entering a contest.

The expected number of

solvers participating (because solver expertise is a random variable) ne is decreasing in
the xed cost cf . For ideation projects and trial and error projects, the number of solvers
participating in a free-entry xed price open innovation is no more than a threshold ni
and nt , respectively. Both thresholds are also decreasing in the xed cost cf .8
To mitigate under-investment in e&ort caused by the negative externality among solvers,
existing literature on R&D tournaments (Taylor 1995, Fullerton and McAfee 1999, Che
and Gale 2003) suggests that a free-entry R&D tournament is in general not optimal, and
it is necessary to restrict the size of a R&D tournament, potentially all the way down to
two (Fullerton and McAfee 1999, Che and Gale 2003). Theorem 1c shows that this result
cannot be straightforwardly transferred to innovation contests as described in this paper.
Theorem 1c Consider a xed price open innovation contest with n solvers. (i) If
the seeker’s weight on the performance of the best solution, ', is high enough, free-entry
open innovation contest can be optimal for all three types of projects. When the seeker’s
objective is to maximize the performance of the best solution (' = 1), free-entry open
innovation contest is always optimal for ideation projects and trial and error projects. It
is also optimal for expertise-based projects with Gumbel distributed solver expertise with
scale parameter
8

if

 /2. (ii) If the seeker’s weight on the performance of the best

When cf = 0, we have ne = n which implies that for any given number of solvers n, all solvers would

participate in a xed price open innovation contest for an expertise-based project. When cf = 0, we have
ni =

and nt =

which also imply that for a ideation project and a trial-and-error project, a xed

price open innovation contest can accommodate any given number of solvers. Therefore, when we study
the case where the number of solvers is a decision variable for the seeker with cf = 0 in Section 7 (neS ,
niS and ntS ), this decision will not be bounded above.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium probability of winning for a particular solver, e&ort (e or m ), the
seeker’s optimal expected prot as a function of the number of solvers n. (# has a zero
mean Gumbel distribution with

= 2 for expertise-based projects, # = 1 for ideation and

trial and error projects, ' = 1, cf = 0.1,

= 2,  = 1, c1 = 0.1, and c2 = 0.1. Figures

illustrate only the curvatures not the scales)
solution, ', is su^ciently low, a free-entry open innovation contest may not be optimal.
When the seeker’s objective is to maximize the average performance of all solutions (' = 0),
free-entry open innovation contest is not optimal for any of the three types of projects.
Theorem 1c indicates that whether free-entry open innovation is optimal for the seeker
critically hinges on the seeker’s objective. If the seeker primarily cares more about the
performance of the best solution, free-entry open innovation is optimal. In this case, the
seeker obtains a unique benet of having more participants for ideation and expertisebased projects: higher solver diversity.

This is consistent with an empirical study on

166 scientic problems posted on Innocentive’s website by Lakhani et al. (2007) who nd
that problem solving success is related to the ability to attract specialized solvers with
diverse scientic interests. When free-entry open innovation is optimal, Theorem 1b and
Theorem 1c also imply that the seeker might be better o& by subsidizing part of the xed
cost for solvers to encourage entry.
For expertise-based projects, the e&ect of higher solver diversity is captured by the
term

R#
#

#nF (#)n1 f (#) d# in the seeker’s expected prot (3). This expression can be
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thought of as the expected value of the highest expertise among the n solvers. The more
solvers, the higher the best solver’s expertise is likely to be. For a Gumbel distributed
noise variable with mean #o and scale parameter , the expected highest expertise among
n solvers is #o +
functions,

ln n.

Hence, for an expertise-based project with logarithmic return

can be viewed as the coe^cient of return on having more solvers while 

is the coe^cient of return on higher e&ort.

The condition

 /2 in the Theorem 1c

basically says that when the return on diversity is strong enough relative to the return on
e&ort, the diversity benet overcomes the undesirable e&ect of under-investment in solver
e&ort that is associated with having a larger solver pool (see (g) in Figure 3).
For an ideation project, this benet of higher solver diversity is reected by the term
ln n in the seeker’s expected prot (5). Not knowing the seeker’s taste, solvers build
one single prototype. Having more participants consequently increases the total amount
of experimentation and as a result the best solution provides a better t to the seeker’s
taste.

For ideation projects, Theorem 1b indicates that the diversity benet of having

more solvers outweighs the negative externality e&ect of solvers’ under-investment in e&ort
such that free-entry open innovation is optimal (see (h) in Figure 3).
Free-entry open innovation is always optimal for trial and error projects. This is due to
a unique feature of the trial and error project: parallel experiments are perfectly cumulative
across solvers. From the seeker’s point of view, solver A conducting 4 parallel experiments
and solver B conducting 6 parallel experiments is equivalent to one solver conducting 10
parallel experiments. This perfect cumulation of e&ort across solvers is reected by the
term ln nm in the seeker’s expected prot (6). Thus, although each solver’s equilibrium
number of experiments is decreasing in n, the total number of experiments across all
solvers, nm , is actually increasing in n. As a result, the seeker’s optimal expected prot
increases as n becomes larger (see (i) in Figure 3).
The next observation further illustrates the benet of a free-entry open innovation to
the seeker.

Normally, the sponsor of a contest could increase its payo& by charging

contestants a collectable entry-fee (e.g., Taylor 1995).

In contrast, the next corollary

shows that in the innovation contest we study, and a seeker who solely focuses on the
performance of the best solution, for ideation projects and trial and error projects, it is in
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the seeker’s best interest to charge zero entry-fee.
Corollary Consider the case that the seeker can charge an entry-fee from a participating
solver. If the seeker’s objective is to maximize the performance of the best solution (' = 1),
for ideation projects and trial and error projects, the optimal entry-fee is zero.
From a solver’s perspective, the e&ect of an entry-fee is the same as the e&ect of xedcosts.

However, from the seeker’s perspective, unlike the xed-cost, the seeker collects

entry-fees paid by participating solvers. One might expect that the seeker could do better
by charging such an entry-fee. The above result indicates that for ideation projects and
trial and error projects with ' = 1, the benet of higher diversity of a large solver pool is
so strong that the seeker should charge no entry-fee and thus promote a maximum level
of participation from the solvers. For expertise-based projects, corresponding analytical
results cannot be obtained. However, straightforward numerical examples demonstrate
that the same conclusion holds9 .

5

Enhancing the E^ciency of Open Innovation

The results of Section 4 show that for innovation contests as dened in this paper, contrary
to the classic Economics result for contests, free-entry (large n) can be optimal. We now
investigate the applicability of another standard result to our specic setting: the optimality of xed price awards. Specically, we study the impact of choosing an alternative
award mechanism, a performance contingent award, on the seeker’s prots. One way to
implement a performance contingent award is through a royalty contract. For example,
the o^ce product retailer Staples has recently conducted large scale innovation contests
and rewarded successful solvers by allocating them a percentage of the associated prots
instead of granting them a x reward (see WSJ 2006). For ease of exposition, we consider
the case that the seeker’s goal is to maximize the performance of the best solution (' = 1)
and the solver’s xed cost of participation is zero (cf = 0).
9

However, it is worth noting that our results only establish the optimality of free entry for xed price

contests. There could exist more complicated mechanisms (with or without entry-fee) such as the one we
will discuss in the next section that can do better than the free-entry open innovation contest with xed
price award.
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In a contest with a performance contingent award, the winner is awarded a proportion
*, of the performance of his solution (where 0 < * < 1).

After observing the seeker’s

proposed award share *, the n solvers simultaneously choose the level of e&ort to exert.
Each participating solver will then submit his solution.
Consider a solver i with endowed expertise #i .

Given the seeker’s award share *

and his own expertise #i , solver i needs to decide how much improvement e&ort, ei , and
experimentation e&ort mi to exert. Suppose all other solvers exert e&orts e and m. Then,
the general problem for solver i in a contest with performance contingent award can be
written as
max

ei 0,mi 1

$i (ei , mi ) = * (max {vj (#j , e, m, j ) , j})
× Pr {vi (#i , ei , mi , i ) > max {vj (#j , e, m, j ) , j 6= i}}  c1 ei  c2 mi .

Let e (*) and m (*) be the solver’s equilibrium strategy for a given award share *.
Given the solvers’ equilibrium strategy, the seeker’s problem is to choose the award
share * to maximize the expected payo& which is just 1  * percent of the expected
performance of the best solution generated from the open innovation contest. Therefore,
the seeker’s problem is
max p (Ap , *) = (1  *) max {vk (#k , e (*) , m (*) , k ) , k = 1, 2, ..., n} .

0<*<1

The following Theorem shows that with the logarithmic return function r (e) =  ln e,
a contest with performance contingent award is more protable to the seeker than xed
price awards.
Theorem 2

For ideation projects and trial and error projects, the seeker makes a

higher expected prot in an open innovation contest with a performance contingent award
than in an open innovation contest with a xed price award. For expertise-based projects,
the seeker may or may not benet from an open innovation contest with a performance
contingent award.
For both, ideation and trial and error projects, a contest with performance contingent
award enhances the e^ciency of open innovation (Figure 4). In such a contest, the amount
of award a solver potentially can win depends on the realized performance of the solver’s
21
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Figure 4: The seeker’s expected prots with performance contingent award and xed
price award as functions of the number of solvers n for ideation projects and trial and
error projects. ( = 2,  = 1, c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.1, and # = 1)
solution, which is stochastically increasing in his e&ort. From a solver’s point of view, a
performance contingent award presents two incentives to increase e&ort: exerting higher
e&ort not only increases the probability of winning, but also the amount of award that is
received in the case of winning. The second incentive is missing in a xed price contest.
Thus, a performance contingent award creates a stronger incentive compared to a xed
price award. Figure 4 also indicates that the benets of a performance contingent award
diminish as the number of solvers becomes larger. With a larger number of solvers, both
the negative externality e&ect and the diversity benet are so strong that all other factors
become negligible.

This observation suggests that for ideation projects and trial and

error projects, using a simple xed price award would not sacrice much prot for the
seeker in large contests. However, for small contests with a limited number of solvers,
it is advisable to use performance contingent awards to enhance the protability of open
innovation contests.
A performance contingent award, however, may not work for expertise-based projects.
Recall that unlike ideation projects and trial and error projects, in an expertise-based
project, solvers are di&erentiated in endowed expertise and the design process is not inuenced by random noise. A solver with relatively low endowed expertise still has a chance
to win, but predicts that the award he potentially could win is limited because it is proportional to his low endowed expertise plus his equilibrium e&ort. As a result, solvers with
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relatively low endowed expertise become more conservative in exerting e&ort compared to
a xed price contest. Of course, solvers with relatively high endowed expertise become
more aggressive compared to a xed price contest. Therefore, the power of a contest with
performance contingent award for an expertise-based project depends on the distribution
of solvers’ endowed expertise F (#).

6

Internal R&D vs. Open Innovation Systems

In this section, we contrast the protability of internal R&D with two di&erent types of
innovation contests. One is an innovation contest that is administrated by the seeker (as
done by QVC or Staples), and another one is an innovation contest that is administrated
by an independent intermediary (as done by Innocentive).

To make the comparisons

tractable, we consider the case that the seeker’s goal is to maximize the performance of
the best solution (' = 1) and the solver’s xed cost of participation is zero (cf = 0).
We rst examine the seeker’s optimal internal R&D strategy for each type of project.
Let cs1 and cs2 be the seeker’s costs of improvement e&ort and experimentation e&ort,
respectively. For an expertise-based project, let #s be the seeker’s endowed expertise on
the project. If the seeker chooses to conduct the project internally, her problem can be
written as
max I (e, m) = v (#s , e, m, )  cs1 e  cs2 m,

e0,m1

where the performance function v (#s , e, m, ) is dened in (1).
When administrating an open innovation contest, the seeker needs to develop a pool of
participating solvers through advertising, invitations, and other means. There is a cost
associated with such solver pool development activities. We assume to develop a solver
network with n solvers, the seeker incurs a cost of cs n which is linear in the size of the
solver pool n. The seeker’s problem for a self-administrated open innovation system is
max S (n) =  (n)  cs n,
n2

where  (n) is the seeker’s optimal expected prot in a xed price open innovation
contest with n solvers which is dened in Theorem 1b.
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Solving the above problem for

a logarithmic return function r (e) =  ln e and Gumbel distributed solver expertise with
scale parameter

for expertise-based projects, the optimal size of the solver pool the

seeker would develop for expertise-based, ideation, and trial and error projects are
$ 2
 4cs 
+
e
nS =
,
2cs

,
cs

niS 

(7)

(8)

and
ntS

=

s

cs

,

(9)

respectively. Note that the seeker’s marginal value of obtaining an additional solution is
decreasing in our model. For the seeker, each solution he receives corresponds to a draw
of some distribution. Because of the properties of the extreme value distribution, the extra
gain from this draw decreases.
If the seeker decides to use an open innovation contest with no solvers that is administrated by an independent intermediary, the seeker needs to pay a xed fee, p, to use the
intermediary’s service. For example, Innocentive charges a xed fee to allow a seeker to
run a xed number of contests on its website. In this case, the seeker’s optimal expected
prots for the three types of projects are O =  (no )  p, where  (no ) is dened in
Theorem 1b for each type of project.
As discussed above, both innovation contest approaches (self-administrated and intermediary administered) su&er from a loss of e^ciency caused by the under-investment in
solver e&ort. However, relative to internal R&D, there exists a second form of ine^ciency,
which is the classical “double marginalization” e&ect in decentralized systems. With internal R&D, the seeker’s investment in R&D costs directly generates performance.

In

contrast, in an innovation contest, the seeker and the solvers form a decentralized system.

The seeker’s investment in the award size cannot directly generate performance.

Instead, it needs to induce the solvers to exert e&orts which in turn generate performance.
Thus, the attractiveness of open innovation relative to internal R&D depends on whether
or not it can o&er su^cient benets to overcome the two e^ciency losses. Theorem 3a
characterizes the seeker’s optimal R&D mechanism.
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Figure 5: Conditions for each innovation mechanism to be optimal for each project type
Theorem 3a Let r (e) =  ln e be the solvers’ e&ort function and consider Gumbel
distributed solver expertise with scale parameter

for expertise-based projects. Given the

seeker expertise, #s , the e&ort cost, cs1 , the number of solvers at the intermediary, no , and
the price charged by the intermediary, p, the conditions for each innovation mechanism to
e
i
be optimal for each project type are provided in Figure 5. The denitions for SO
, SO
,
t
SO ,

ct2 , f e (), f i (), g e (), g i (), and gt ( ) are provided in the Appendix.

The seeker’s optimal choices of R&D mechanism for di&erent project types are illustrated in Figure 6. As indicated in Theorem 3a and shown in Figure 6, if the external
solver’s e&ort cost is lower than a certain level, either self-administrated or intermediaryadministrated open innovation is a better choice than internal R&D. With low e&ort
costs, external solvers would exert higher e&ort in equilibrium which will create su^cient
benets to o&set the ine^ciency of the open innovation system.
Theorem 3a and Figure 6 also reveal a counter-inuitive di&erence between self-administrated
open innovation system and intermediary-administrated open innovation system.

For

expertise-based projects and ideation projects, self-administrated contests are preferred to
intermediary-administrated contests when the return on e&ort coe^cient is small. In contrast, for trial and error projects self-administrated contests are preferred to intermediaryadministrated contests when the return on e&ort coe^cient is large.
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Figure 6: The seeker’s optimal R&D mechanism. (# has a zero mean Gumbel distribution
with

= 2 for expertise-based projects, # = 1 for ideation and trial and error projects,

= 2 for ideation projects, c1s = 0.1, c2s = 0.1, cs = 0.05, #s = 1, and no = 5.  is the
return on improvement e&ort coe^cient for expertise-based projects and ideation projects.
is the scale parameter for Gumbel distributions for all projects.)
above, with a larger solver pool, each solver exerts less e&ort in equilibrium due to the
negative externality among solvers. With a high return on e&ort coe^cient, this negative e&ect of lower e&ort is amplied for expertise-based projects and ideation projects.
Therefore, it is optimal for the seeker to reduce the size of the self-administrated open
innovation system. This is reected in the optimal sizes of the solver pool for these two
types of projects specied in equations (7) and (8) which both are decreasing in the return
on e&ort coe^cient .
However, for trial and error projects e&ort is perfectly cumulative across solvers. Although each solver exerts less e&ort in a larger open innovation system, the total amount of
e&ort exerted by all solvers is actually higher (see detailed discussion in Section 4). With
a high return on e&ort coe^cient, there hence exists a stronger incentive for the seeker to
develop a larger solver pool which strengthens the attractiveness of a self-administrated
contest. This is reected in the optimal size of the solver pool specied in equation (9)
which is increasing in the return on e&ort coe^cient .
In addition to providing access to a network of solvers, an intermediary-administrated
contest can o&er other benets beyond what is captured in our model. This includes the
fact that the identity of the seeker is kept private (in some cases, the seeker prefers the
outside world not to know that he is working on a particular problem), the benets of
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establishing a trust-worthy third party that can broker the intellectual property rights
between the seeker and the solvers, and the development of the required technical and
organizational infrastructure.
Theorem 3b Consider a xed price intermediary-administrated open innovation contest with no solvers and a logarithmic return function r (e) =  ln e. (i) For expertise-based
projects, if the upper bound on the support of F, #, is high enough, there exists a solver
pool size, ne , such that the seeker strictly prefers open innovation to internal R&D when
no  ne . Otherwise, there exists a # s such that the seeker strictly prefers internal R&D to
open innovation when the solver’s own expertise #s  # s . (ii) For ideation projects, there
exists ni such that the seeker strictly prefers open innovation to internal R&D when no 
ni . (iii) For trial and error projects, if cs2 > c2 , there exists a solver pool size, nt , such
that the seeker strictly prefers open innovation to internal R&D when no  nt . Otherwise,
the seeker always prefers internal R&D to open innovation.
For an expertise-based project, the benet of an intermediary-administrated open innovation system is that there potentially could be a “genius” in the solver pool with a
much higher endowed expertise than the seeker’s own endowed expertise #s . For ideation
projects, solvers are di&erentiated as captured by the random noise variable  in the performance function. An intermediary-administrated open innovation benets the seeker by
providing a higher diversity in solutions. For trial and error projects, an intermediaryadministrated open innovation o&ers no additional benets relative to internal R&D other
than potential cost savings.

Hence, without a cost advantage (i.e., cs2  c2 ), open in-

novation is never a better choice for the seeker. This conclusion seems surprising given
that we have shown that free-entry open innovation is always optimal for a trial and error
project due to its perfect e&ort cumulation. However, just because of this perfect e&ort
cumulation, the seeker is able to completely replicate the benet of multiple experiments
internally.
Figure 7 summarizes the insights of the above discussions by illustrating how the seeker’s
optimal innovation process (internal vs. open) changes with respect to relevant parameters
for each type of project.

Consistent with intuition, as the seeker’s own costs of e&ort

increase, the necessary number of solvers (i.e., ne , ni , and nt ) that leads the seeker to
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Figure 7:

Intermediary open
better

Intermediary open
better

The seeker’s optimal choice between Internal R&D and Intermediary-

administrated Open Innovation System with no solvers. (# has a zero mean Gumbel
distribution with
projects,

= 2 for expertise-based projects, # = 1 for ideation and trial and error

= 2,  = 1, c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.1 and #s = 2)

choose an intermediary-administrated open innovation over internal R&D decreases for
all project types.

For both, expertise-based projects and ideation projects, the seeker

prefers open innovation to internal R&D even when there exists a cost advantage over the
external solvers (i.e., c1s < c1 ), whereas this can never happen for trial and error projects
(when c2s  c1 ). Thus, we conclude that expertise-based projects and ideation projects
are more suitable for an an intermediary-administrated open innovation model than trial
and error projects.
Corollary Consider a logarithmic return function r (e) =  ln e. Using a xed price
open innovation contest, for expertise-based and trial and error projects, the seeker benets
from solutions with better performances rather than from lower costs. For ideation projects,
the seeker benets from both better solutions and from lower costs.
For the logarithmic return function r (e) =  ln e, the seeker’s total R&D costs are
,  + , and

for expertise-based, ideation, and trial and error projects, respectively.

The optimal awards the seeker o&ers in xed price open innovation contests for expertisebased, ideation, and trial and error projects are , , and , respectively. Regardless of
whether R&D is carried out internally or externally, the seeker spends the same amount
for expertise-based projects and trial and error projects. For ideation projects, the seeker
spends less with open innovation compared to internal R&D. In an ideation project, since
each solver must submit one prototype, the seeker obtains no prototypes for free in the open
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no

innovation contest whereas in internal R&D, the seeker incurs costs for each prototype
built.

The corollary shows that open innovation should not be viewed primarily as a

mechanism to achieve cost savings. Instead, open innovation leads to better performance.
This point should be kept in mind in the ongoing discussion about the impact of open
innovation on our economy. Even if some R&D work is shifted to other regions because
of the locations of the solvers, the local economy (and society) would still benet from
obtaining better products (which might translate also in more non-R&D jobs).

7

Discussion and Conclusion

The promise of Open Innovation is appealing: increase your capacity to innovate by tapping into a network of knowledge transcending organizational boundaries. But, as we have
shown, not all innovation problems are suited equally well for this type of process. Unlike
in the case of internal innovation, solvers participating in open innovation contests have
to fear that their problem solving e&ort might not be nancially rewarded. This leads
them to under-invest in e&ort, and an in-e^ciency in the market. The seeker (or, if applicable, the intermediate) organizing the innovation contest needs to be conscious about
this e&ect and design the reward system taking into account the type of the innovation
problem (see Theorem 1a). In addition to choosing an appropriate reward, a key question
for the Open Innovation system relates to the number of potential solvers. While Economists have argued that contests should be limited to two solvers in order to minimize
the under-investment e&ect while still beneting from competition, we show that for an
innovation contest the benets of diversity can outweigh or at least mitigate the negative
e&ect of under-investment. This can make large, fully open contests prot maximizing to
the seeker (Theorem 1b).
To further increase the e^ciency of innovation contests, mechanisms beyond the performance contingent award can be conceived. For example, one could design a multi-round
contest, in which the rst round is played with a large pool of contestants who make relatively little investment. This will identify skillful (and / or lucky) solvers who then could
be allowed to play in a limited (“private”) second round contest. In this second round,
the limited pool of solvers will drastically increase the probability of any participating
29

solver winning the award and hence overcome some of the under-investment problem.
Furthermore, it is interesting to extend our one-dimensional innovation model into more
complex innovation models such as innovation with unforeseeable uncertainty whose R&D
processes is often characterized as “open ended search” for the unknown unknowns (e.g.,
Sommer and Loch 2004). For an “open ended search” problem, open innovation contests
could enable the seeker not only to improve performance along a known dimension, but
also to see if there exist solutions/ideas that the seeker is not even aware of. Alternative
contest mechanisms and innovation models are thus fruitful areas of future research.
Future empirical research could analyze how innovation contests are operated in practice
as well as how (and if) they are replacing internal innovation and development processes.
Based on our ndings, we certainly expect a growing popularity of this form of innovation,
with applications going well beyond the current focus on biology or chemistry. To take an
example “close to home”, consider the academic research process that leads to publications
in a journal such as Management Science, and imagine how an author might benet from
relying on the help of an experienced solver when searching for the proof of a di^cult
theorem!
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